So- I organized my paper into two parts. The first part is done, but it is already as long as my whole paper is supposed to be… need to find a way to cut this down. Here’s part number one: tell me what can go.
Introduction
In an essay considering the possibility of a Chess-playing machine, the mathematician Claude Shannon presents an interesting dilemma: “chess is generally considered to require ‘thinking’ for skilful play; a solution of this problem will force us either to admit the possibility of a mechanized thinking or to further restrict our concept of ‘thinking.’” In a similar vein, McKenzie Wark theorizes, in his work GAM3R 7H3ORY, how the subversive element of “play” has been removed from contemporary video games, which instead “[respond] to the boredom of the player with endless games of repetition.” Such games would require nothing more than “mechanized thinking” as proposed by Shannon. Further, Steven Poole, in his essay “Working for the Man,” has argued that video games are often little more than exercises in following the rules, and the most successful player is the one who follows the rules the best. If this is true, then we should find that contemporary video games discourage creative thought, training their players to “think” like machines. Further, the more difficult or competitive the game, the more its players are assimilated to mechanized thinking.
Video games, then, would be a primary site of what, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” Martin Heidegger calls “Enframing:” that is, the force of technology to recode the world in its image, and thus condition us to think only within its terms, while hiding the true essence of the world. The gamer, by being “enframed,” gives up his humanity in exchange for an image of the “human” as that which interacts with the computer: the “U” in UI. Or, as Adorno explains it: “The movements machines demand of their users already have the violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment. Not least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that things… assume a form that limits contact with them to mere operation, and tolerates no surplus” (40). As those extraneous motions fall into disuse and are lost, something new is formed: closer to machine than human. As the possibility of creative expression deteriorates, experience itself is slowly drained of meaning.
Yet Heidegger, quoting Hölderlin, insists that “But where danger is, grows / the saving power also” (28). In short, this “saving power” is that which may reveal the world in its true essence. Heidegger identifies the arts, which are centered around the poetic revealing of poiēsis, as holding this saving power. Following the root of poiēsis, however, Heidegger discovers that the arts and technology were once both called by one name: technē (34). The division which has grown between the arts and sciences, specifically that which forgets the human basis of technology, which couples art to the human, but allows technology to run free, this division, Heidegger argues, has obscured the essence of both art and science, thus hiding their shared root: technē. If we do not reclaim technology as our own, “[it] may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth” (35). That is to say, if we continue to give technology free reign, we may at last learn the essence of technology only by noting what has been lost at the moment technology disjoins itself from the human entirely. Only by discovering human creativity, the “saving power,” within the technological, can this fate be avoided.
Is it possible that in video games there waits such a “saving power”? If so, why hasn’t it been found? By closely examining several games and critical writing on games, I hope to display the very human creativity of gamers, and explain why this has been overlooked by most critics of video games.
Octet
The most appropriate place to begin solving this problem is with an explanation of my paper’s title: “Beginners Play Atari.” To most Americans, the word Atari refers to a company, producers of the Atari video game consoles. Anyone who has followed the development of video games can attest that early games are, in many cases, much more difficult than games are released today. So when I say “beginners play Atari,” I mean to refer not to the difficulty of the games, but to a certain concept of gaming, in which a single player pits his or her skills against a computer opponent. In these games every element of the playing field is programmed except for the actions of the player’s avatar (which is often already very limited). This is “for beginners” insofar as it provides an easy framework for interpretation. Most critical work on video games seems to be stuck under this model, which parallels the traditional artist/spectator dichotomy. Under this model, the player/spectator, although granted token agency, has no real freedom outside of performing the actions prescribed by the designer/artist. As difficulty increases, freedom is further limited.
Using such games as case studies, it is easy to see why critics have continued to use the general outline of the artist/spectator model. The player has as little control over her avatar as the museum patron has over a painting: choosing to not to follow the game’s objectives offers as much escape as closing one’s eyes. In order to ascribe creativity agency to the gamer, it is necessary that we abandon this model.
Attempts have been made in this direction, but I feel they have been largely unsuccessful. Ian Bogost, in Persuasive Games, is perhaps the first critic to account for the actions of the player as significant to the interpretation of a game, in what he calls “Procedurality.” A game does more than present viewers with a series of sounds and images; it establishes procedures for the players to follow. Bogost claims that these procedures should be the primary object of study when interpreting a video game. But that shift in focus has as yet done nothing to break the artist/spectator dichotomy. The game’s design retains its position as determining force, and the player still obediently follows procedure. Bogost’ response seems to be advocating for a more responsible approach to game design, one that would perhaps encourage creative thinking, but this still places creative agency entirely within the hands of the designer, and is thus self-defeating.
There is another approach available, which takes into account the fact that many of today’s games are multiplayer. The possibility for social and political action could open avenues for creative expression not available in single-player games. Leading this approach is Henry Jenkins, who has shown that players of games like The Sims are politically active within the game’s world. But The Sims is designed to facilitate community building and politics, so it is not clear how much this could be considered anything more than following procedure. Further, it is questionable how effective Jenkins’ approach would be when applied to other, less obviously open games. Moreover, Jenkins makes little or no mention of the UI or controls for The Sims. The political events Jenkins examines are, at worst, only adjacent to the game itself. At best, insofar as they are not innovations in the operation of the game, they affect the content of experience, but not the form. The technology of The Sims might, in Heidegger’s terms, “bring to presence” the “essence” of sociality, and how new media have provided new and interesting platforms for human interaction, but Jenkins has not turned toward the essence of technology itself. The division between the human and the technological remains intact.
Before admitting the gamer is nothing more than a slave to the system, even more so than the television viewer because he actively works toward his own subjugation,
there are a few other options. We could examine how the gamer can be creative through a “pro-sumer” model: using modding software to create her own content, but again this does not look for creativity within the gameplay itself. Another avenue to investigate, which I don’t have time for in this paper, is the casual gaming movement, whose focus is on the quick apprehension of a system of rules, and whose wide market frees the player from commitment to any specific rule set. For this paper, however, my focus is on what are called “hardcore” games, generally produced for mass audiences. It is my belief that, contrary to the general opinion, the highest levels of creativity in gaming are to be found in competitive games, and that, contrary to what is found under the designer/gamer dichotomy, it is precisely hardcore games’ difficulty and competitive nature that makes possible, encourages, and even necessitates creativity.
To follow this line of thinking we must return to the phrase “beginners play Atari,” which is a translation of a “proverb” from the ancient Japanese board game, Go. The general idea is that the most obvious route to victory, if pursued, will be easily defended against, leaving the aggressor worse off than when she started. More often than not, putting an opponent’s piece into Atari, in an attempt to capture it, is a wasted move. The experienced player grants her opponent the small victory and secures her position elsewhere on the board. The nuances need not be elaborated further, for the problem is the same everywhere. The beginner has only a coarse understanding of the game and hastily makes decisions, neglecting the broader implications of her actions. As scholars, we must heed this advice. Without an adequate understanding of our subjects, we can do nothing more than fight over minor victories that have little bearing on the overall game.
Video game studies, if it exists at all, is very much in danger of making itself irrelevant by ignoring the subtleties of its subject. McKenzie Wark, in his formulation of a game theorist, claims that “For a gamer to be a theorist might not require the ability to play any particular game especially well. The prizes have nothing to do with thinking the game.” While I agree that it is possible to rely on the testimony of skilled players if you have little experience yourself, this still requires the view of an expert. If it is not already, it should be clear by the end of this presentation that the veteran and novice gamer have fundamentally different understandings of the game. The theorist who makes claims as a novice gamer does so with the same authority with which a reader may appraise a novel written in a language he does not speak.
This same false sense of authority allowed Ian Bogost to publish the following description of the game Counter-Strike: “Strategy in Counter-Strike is grounded in free-for-all: players often use “bunny hopping,” or continuous jumping, to avoid fire; they respawn immediately when killed; they can fire effectively while running or jumping. Players enter the game and start scuffling immediately, without the need for preparation of any sort” (75). While several games might fit the description Bogost has given, Counter-Strike is not one of them. Spending any significant amount of time playing this game would directly contradict nearly every one of these claims. I won’t take the time here to adequately debunk these statements; my purpose is only to point out how basing one’s claims on a novice skill level can lead to a highly flawed interpretation. On the subject of Proust, Adorno remarks that “it is Proust’s courtesy to spare the reader the embarrassment of believing himself cleverer than the author” (49). For true critical work can only be done from a position of respect, and although Bogost grants this respect to the makers of so-called “serious games,” he generally denies it of games produced by the entertainment sector: especially “hardcore” competitive games, like Counter-Strike. In neglecting to take “seriously” non-“serious games,” Bogost fails to discover the creative creative potential of video games and gamers.
after this, is the part I’m actually excited about writing, where I give detailed descriptions of some games, etc. etc. But yeah… shit.